Hitherto, the concept of empowerment has been largely denied a place of prominence in both mainstream academic and applied psychology. It is argued that if this concept is to expand beyond the field of community psychology into more traditional areas of psychology, such as social, personality, clinical and school psychology, its moral and psychological foundations should be more clearly articulated. In order to advance this proposition, an integrativc conceptual model of empowerment is presented. Within this framework, the ethical and therapeutic legitimacy of empowering practices, obstacles for their inclusion in mainstream psychology, and possibilities for their future development are explored. Some of the benefits to be derived from the adoption of the concept of empowerment in academic and applied psychology are outlined.
If research on empowerment and policies designed to empower individuals are to reach beyond community psychology and have an impact in other, more traditional areas such as clinical, school, personality, and social psychology, then it is incumbent upon community psychologists to assert die legitimacy of these endeavours. I will argue that the ethical, psychological and therapeutic foundations of empowerment provide ample legitimacy for its vigorous pursuit in the discipline.
Empowerment is generally understood as interventions and policies intended to Canadian Psychology/Psychologic canadiennc, 35:4 enhance the degree of control vulnerable individuals exercise over their lives (Rappaport, 1981 (Rappaport, ,1987 . Hitherto, this concept has been largely denied a respectable place in mainstream academic and applied psychology (Joffe & Albee, 1988; Sarason 1982 Sarason , 1988 . With the notable exception of community psychologists (Florin & Wandersman, 1990; Wolff, 1987; Zimmerman 8c Rappaport, 1988) and some primary preventionists (Albec, Joffe, & Dusenbury, 1988) , psychologists have neglected to view empowerment research and/or practice as legitimate activities. In die most recent edition of'the Journal ofSocial Issues (Spacapan & Thompson, 1991) , entided "Perceived control in vulnerable populations," no references could be found to die concept of empowerment. Similarly, no specific mention of this concept could be seen in the new book The psychology of human control (Friedman & Lackey, 1991) . These are only two examples of missed opportunities by control researchers to take advantage of studies on empowerment (e.g., Rappaport, Swift & Hess, 1984; Zimmerman, 1990 ). This paper is designed to enhance the cross-fertilization between research on empowerment and some mainstream psychological theories and practices. The concept of explanatory style advanced by Seligman (1990) , and the four models of helping and coping identified by Brickman et al. (1982) will be instrumental in demonstrating the connections between empowerment, theories of control, and counseling approaches.
The article is divided into four parts. The first section presents a conceptual model of empowerment. This is necessary in order to (a) clarify the various meanings of die term, and (h) provide a framework for research and action. The second section elaborates on the legitimate ethical and psychological foundations of empowerment. While the third part deals with obstacles to be encountered in promoting empowerment in mainstream psychology, the last portion offers some directions to facilitate this integration.
Empowerment: A Descriptive and Prescriptive Model
The purpose of the model to be presented is twofold: (a) to understand the concept of empowerment by delineating its mullifaceted nature, and (b) to provide a framework for the advancement of research and action in this area. In other words, the model will describe the constitutive elements of empowerment and serve as a basis for its prescription in psychology.
The circular representation of the model found in Figure 1 highlights the main three elements of empowerment as discussed in the literature. These arc values, processes and agents/stakeholders. Each third of the model is subdivided into three sections. The outer circle denotes the main components of empowerment at their most abstract level. The middle circle specifies the question/s to be asked of values, processes and agents/ stakeholders. The inner circle details in concrete form the meaning of the key constitutive elements. The values of empowerment, that is, selfdetermination, distributive justice, and collaborative and democratic participation, inform and guide the process as well the agents/stakeholders of empowerment. This influence is represented in Figure 1 by the arrows pointing from values to the other two sections. These values are incorporated by researchers as well as by human services providers. The arrows pointing from processes to agents/stakeholders and vice versa represent the dynamic relationship between the people who conduct research and interventions and the processes involved. 1 will discuss now each section of the model in more detail.
VALUES
Values play a central role in empowerment research and actions. Empowerment studies and empowering interventions arc explicitly concerned with, and guided by, three princi-pal moral values: self-determination, distributive justice, and collaborative and democratic participation. The ethical foundations of these values will be articulated in the next section of this paper. My intention at this juncture is to show that these values have been central in the development of the concept of empowerment.
Against a background of paternalistic attitudes in social and psychological interventions (Swift, 1984) , Rappaport (1981 Rappaport ( , 1986 Rappaport ( , 1987 advanced the concept and practice of empowerment in psychology as means toward the achievement of self-determination of individuals in need of changes in their lives. The inherent value of persons choosing a course of action on their own is indeed a constitutive part of what Riessman (1986) called the empowerment ethos. Self-determination, as a fundamental principle in human services, has been recognized not only in psychology, but also in social work (Breton, 1989; McDermott, 1975; Moreau, 1990) , social policy (Boyte, 1990 , McKnight, 1989 Wineman, 1984) , education (Freire, 1971 (Freire, , 1985 , and even agriculture and engineering (Ovitt, 1989) , among other professions.
The second value, distributive justice, promotes fair and equitable distribution of resources and burdens in society (Miller, 1978) . This value derives from the realization that misery and happiness are largely dictated by the way material goods and access to services are allocated in society. Contrary to the enduring belief in North America that equality of opportunity exists, the promoters of empowerment assert that the unequal distribution of wealth and power in society severely restricts access to services, education and employment (Albee, 1986; Boyte & Riessman, 1986; Rappaport, 1984) . Consequently, empowerment calls for interventions designed to rectify this imbalance of opportunities wherever it exists. Distributive justice applies at the micro-social level, where people and small groups negotiate the fair allocation of resources, as well as at the macro-social sphere, where advocacy, social and political action are called for.
The third fundamental value underpinning the notion of empowerment is collaborative and democratic participation. This value reflects best the ideal that persons affected by individual and social interventions should be part of the decision-making process. This principle, also identified by Riessman (1986) as a key element of the empowerment ethos, is a defining characteristic of empowering scientific and socio-political processes (Rappaport, 1990 ).
These three constitutive moral values inform the actions of researchers, therapists and social interventionists identified with the tenets of empowerment. In the next two sections we shall see how these principles permeate the people and processes involved in empowerment.
AGENTS/STAKEHOLDERS
The process of empowerment may take place either as a result of the natural actions of persons desirous of attaining higher degrees of control over their affairs, or as a consequence of social interventions coming from outside the setting. Agents are the people whose actions empower themselves and/or others. Stakeholders are persons or groups invited to participate in the process. The ideal is for the stakeholders to become agents of empowerment themselves as soon as possible. As Lerner (1991) 
PROCESSES
This section of the model represents the variety of actions and processes taking place in studying and promoting empowerment. These may be best understood by posing the following questions: how, when, and where docs empowerment occur, and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for it to develop. The inner circle of Figure 1 shows the two main processes of empowerment: research and action. Actions take many forms. They may be the result of powerless individuals initiating social action, or they may come from professionals involved in community organizing, or from therapists empowering women to leave abusive relationships.
What defines an intervention as empowering is not its specific content but rather its adherence to the values of empowerment. In one case political action may be called for in order to improve the housing conditions of a community. In another case empowerment may take die form of helping a person deflect blame for problems from internal sources to external oppressive conditions. As noted earlier, self-determination, distributive justice, and collaborative and democratic participation should predominate at all levels of human co-existence. Therefore, depending upon die situation, empowering processes may be necessary to advance die interests and rights of vulnerable persons in the context of relationships, families, occupational settings, educational institutions, social and political structures, and practically every realm of human endeavour (Lemer, 1991) .
The complex nature of social settings where empowerment is called for necessitates diat psychologists be more versatile and creative in their interventions. Greater degrees of control for vulnerable people cannot always be attained by counseling and dierapy. Social policy recommendations and political actions may have to be incorporated into the psychologist's repertoire.
The analysis of empowerment along die dimensions of values, agents/stakeholders, and processes furnishes a systematic understanding of die field at die same time diat it serves to guide research and action. Aldiough odler models of empowerment have been proposed before (e.g., Wolff, 1987) , I believe die present one to be unique in its explicit emphasis on moral principles. In addition, die model advanced here may prove to be (a) of heuristic value in interpreting and organizing die field of empowerment, and (b) useful in disseminating this concept in mainstream psychology.
Legitimacy
The model of empowerment described above rests on philosophical as well as psychological foundations. Both aspects are necessary to attain an integralive and holistic understanding of empowerment. Moreover, they are mutually complementary. While die moral philosophical basis provides the justification for pursuing empowerment, die psychological ground facilitates its promotion.
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMPOWERMENT
Although the prevailing discourse on empowerment is marked by ethical connotations (Rappaport, 1990) , its moral foundations have not yet been fully explicated. In the present atmosphere of so-called pluralism and ethical relativism, the risk exists of misinterpreting moral imperatives as moral predilections (Lemer, 1991; Wolfe, 1989) . As a result, mainstream psychologists may continue to regard advocacy and empowerment as activities which arc largely dictated, not by ethics, but by personal world-views and preferences. I contend that a compelling argument for empowerment can, and should be made, on die basis of the ethical obligations of psychologists toward society in general and vulnerable populations in particular (sec Steininger, Newell, &: Garcia, 1984; O'Neill, 1989) . Odierwise, mainstream psychologists will continue to regard empowerment as a matter of personal choice and not as a matter of moral duty. Following a discussion of the ethical principles of empowerment, I will attempt to show how these values resonate in die professional ethics literature.
Ethical principles. The direc fundamental pillars of empowerment arc sclf-determina-tion, distributive justice and collaborative and democratic participation. As noted earlier in the model, these principles are widely promulgated by empowerment practitioners. Each of diese values has a respectable tradition in moral philosophy.
Following Olson's (1978) analysis of freedom, self-determination may be thought of as "the individual's ability to pursue chosen goals without excessive frustration" (p. 45). The capacity to carry out one's objectives in life is, according to Rawls, "perhaps the most important primary good" (1972, p. 440 ). This constituent element of self-respect, Rawls claims, "implies a confidence in one's ability ... to fulfill one's intentions" (1972, p. 440) . Ortega y Gassct (1983) , who wrote extensively about self-determination (Ramos Mattci, 1987) , captured die human essence of this value in die expression that 'To live is to constantly decide what we are to become" (1983, p. 190, author's translation) .
The primary good inherent in a sense of autonomy, personal freedom and self-determination may be threatened by at least two sources: (a) a restrictive psychosocial environment, and (b) paternalism. Concerning the former, Aboulafia (1986) states diat "it is clear that die other(s) and die social-economic system can inhibit and prevent die realization of such a self... The obstacle I speak of is the relationship of dominance versus subordinancc" (Aboulafia, 1986, p. 104) . The interpersonal and societal barriers to self-determination identified by Aboulafia have also been widely recognized by die proponents of empowerment (I.erncr, 1991; Serrano Garcia, 1984) .
The second obstacle to self-determination has to do with paternalistic attitudes toward people in need of assistance. Many so-called "benevolent" interventions to help the disadvantaged have infringed upon their sense of self-respect and effectively curtailed tiieir aspirations for self-determination (Gaylin, Glasser, Marcus, 8c Rothman, 1981) . Among applied ethicists, Young (1982) contends that "opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state (legal paternalism) or anodicr adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination" (1982, p. 47) . The many converging critiques on paternalism coalesced to create alternate, empowering strategies (Boytc & Riessman, 1986; Rappaport, 1981 Rappaport, , 1987 Swift, 1984) .
The needs and rights of individuals promoted and protected by self-determination should be complemented with values designed to preserve the needs and rights of fellow community members. This ensures a balancebetween personal fulfillment and communal well-being. Distributive justice is die value invoked to guide the fair and equitable allocation of burdens and resources in society (Facione, Scherer & Attig, 1978; Miller, 1978; Olson, 1978; Rawls, 1972) . In Sidwick's words, diis value puts forth "principles from which we may work out an ideally just distribution of rights and privileges, burdens and pains, among human beings as such" (1922, p. 274) . Similarly, according to Miller (1978) , distributive justice may be defined as "suum cuique, to each his(/her) due" (p. 20). Justice, Miller explains, concerns the distribution of benefits and burdens throughout a society, as it results from the major social institutions -property systems, public organizations, etc. It deals with such matters as the regulation of wages and (where they exist) profits, the protection of persons' rights through the legal system, the allocation of housing, medicine, welfare benefits, etc. (Miller, 1978, p. 22) Proponents of empowerment in psychology and social services have asserted die need to redistribute resources in a more equitable fashion (Albee, Joffe, & Dusenbury, 1988; Rappaport, 1984; McKnight, 1989) . Legal, political, ideological and social interventions have been launched in an effort to reallocate wealth and power in accordance with the precepts of distributive justice.
The intrinsic beneficial qualities of selfdetermination and distributive justice are brought forth by the collaborative and democratic process. The belief in the inherent capacity of individuals to select their goals and defend their interests is recognized in the value of democracy. As Swift noted (1984) , "the concept of democracy and its embodiment in our political institutions are based on the principle of empowering citizens to participate in decisions affecting their welfare" (p. xiii). A commitment to treating persons fairly, equitably, and with respect demands that a collaborative approach be used. This is in opposition to paternalistic models of intervention which have traditionally operated from an expert-knows-best point of view.
While the importance of collaboration and democracy may be publicly upheld by psychologists, an in-depth examination of psychological theories and practices reveals that these values are not always at the forefront of their priorities (Sampson, 1991; Walsh, 1988) . Proponents of empowerment in psychology endeavour to make collaboration and democratic participation one of the first items of their scientific and social agenda (Rappaport, 1986 (Rappaport, , 1990 ). As we shall see next, applied moral philosophers attempt to incorporate primary values into the modusope randi of the professions.
Professional ethics and empowerment. Morality, Frankena (1963) claims, "is not to be a minister merely to one's own good life but to that of others as well" (p. 77). This reasoning, widely endorsed by other moral philosophers (Facione, Scherer & Attig, 1978; Olson, 1978) implies that ethical behaviour should encompass actions designed to enhance the welfare of fellow community members. By extension, professional ethical behaviour calls for efforts to promote the welfare of the community as a whole (Kultgen, 1988) . Reeck (1982) said it well when he claimed that the moral guide of the professional should be the "devotion of professional skills to meeting the needs of client groups and, ultimately, to the common good" (italics in the original, p. 38). Reflecting on the same topic, I^ebacqz (1985) commented: "If the professional's relationship to society is seen as a matter of entrusting of power, then the professional will be bound by obligations to society... It is really a matter of justice of repaying a debt" (p. 85).
Reeck (1982) argues for the legitimacy of empowerment in the professions. He contends that "an ideal that seems common to the moral heritage of the professions is that of enablement" (p. 38), which is understood as the empowering of individuals for the purpose of helping themselves. Consistent with the philosophy of empowerment, Lebacqz claims that meaningful improvement in the life of many citizens cannot be attained without fundamental social changes -changes which require a more equitable distribution of political power (Albee, Joffe & Duscnbury, 1988; Edwards, Reich & Weisskopf, 1986; Ryan, 1981; Schwartz, 1987; Weisband, 1989) . Kultgen (1988) , Lebacqz (1985) , and Reeck (1982) explicitly advance the precepts of empowerment in the professions. They support the process by which individuals acquire control over their lives and the power to enhance their personal and communal welfare. Professions can accelerate this process. However, in establishing their moral duties, professions have traditionally sought to secure only the welfare of their immediate clients and neglected (a) to consider the welfare of the community at large, and (b) the need to change damaging societal structures (Lebacqz, 1985; Reeck, 1982; Wilding, 1982) . Psychology has not escaped this proclivity (Prilleltensky, 1990a (Prilleltensky, , 1990b (Prilleltensky, , 1991 . The obstacles section of this paper will outline in some detail why psychology has been reluctant to embrace empowering paradigms and social change propositions.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMPOWERMENT
Psychology has much to offer, as well as to gain from, the Held of empowerment. The potential of this mutually beneficial relationship will be explored in this section. The psychology of personal control can definitely inform empowerment research (Friedman & lackey, 1991; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Seligman, 1990; Spacapan & Thompson, 1991; Zimmerman, 1990; Zimmerman & Rappaport, 1988) . Control investigators, in turn, can learn a great deal from observing the experience of empowerment in real-life settings (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; Dobyns, Doughty, & Laswell, 1971; Lcrner, 1991) . 1 will review next a number of studies that bear directly on the relationship between issues of personal control, coping, helping, and empowerment. These will show some of the mainstream psychology foundations of empowerment, as well as the therapeutic and protective aspects of empowering processes.
Research. Studies concerning issues of control and empowerment at die individual level of analysis will be reviewed first, followed by research dealing with communities. There arc long-term beneficial repercussions for the early experiences of task mastery and control (Chess & Thomas, 1984; Rolf, Masten, Cicchetti, Neuchterlein, & Weintraub, 1990) . Indeed, as Cowen (1991) recendy noted, "the rooting of relevant life competencies may be the single most important precondition for the young child's development of an early phenomenological sense of empowerment and having control over one's fate" (p. 406). Moreover, important positive effects can be derived from die perception of control, not the least of which is physical health (Lord & Farlow, 1990) . In dieir review of the literature, Thompson and Spacapan (1991) mention improved (a) emotional well-being, (b) ability to cope with stress, (c) health, (d) motor and intellectual performance, and (e) capacity to make desired behavioural changes, as resulting from perceptions of control.
A sense of personal control contributes also to the development of psychosocial resilience (Garmczy, 1984; Rutter, 1987; Scligman, 1990; Zimmerman, 1990) . That is to say, experiences of control act as buffers against future adversities. The opposite is also true. Experiences of helplessness across the life-span render people vulnerable to a range of emotional problems (Seligman, 1990) .
It has been well documented tiiat the experience of helplessness is mediated by cognitive style. Seligman (1990) contends that individuals who explain bad events in terms of external, specific and temporary causes, what he calls optimistic explanatory style, will show greater attempts at control when they encounter adversities in the future. Those who attribute failure to personal, permanent and pervasive factors will likely not assume control when faced with the next setback. Although the degree of helplessness people manifest is moderated by their attributions, an optimistic explanatory style can go only so far in protecting people facing severe or chronic stressors. Recurring or acute life-stressors may teach dieir victims that no matter what they do, their lot in life does not improve. If the adverse effects of these experiences subside, children "will develop the theory that bad events can be changed and conquered. But if they are, in fact, permanent and pervasive, the seeds of hopelessness have been deeply planted" (Seligman, 1990, p. 135) .
To overcome the deeply planted seeds of hopelessness, individuals growing up in permanent and pervasive depriving conditions need more than a change in attributions and perceptions to cope with misfortune. They need real experiences of control to change real-life stressors. Research on empowerment can show how this can be attained (Zimmerman & Rappaport, 1988; Zimmerman, 1990) . The present dominant focus on attributions and perceptions of control should be complemented by research on the increase of actual power in real-life settings. This is the main potential contribution of empowerment research in this area.
Research on the empowerment of communities shows the gains derived from a sense of group cohesion and collective action around specific goals and problems. Florin and Wandersman (1990) describe the em-powering effects of citizen participation, voluntary organizations and community development. Chaws and Wandcrsman (1990) , for example, illustrated how a sense of community may generate social action and enhance the participants' perception and actual control over their environment. Given the action research nature of community empowerment, more will be said about it in the next section.
Action/Intervention. As in the research section, I will examine empowering interventions at the individual and community levels separately. A useful theoretical framework for understanding and appreciating die need for empowerment at the personal level is provided by Brickman and his associates (1982) . They made a comparative analysis of four models of helping and coping and their effects on clients. The techniques they explored were examined in terms of two dimensions: (a) Attribution to self of responsibility for the problem, and (b) Attribution to self of responsibility for the solution. Each variable was divided into high or low. This resulted into four models of helping: (a) medical (People are not held responsible for problems or solutions), (b) compensatory (People are not held responsible for problems but responsible for solutions), (c) moral (People are held responsible for problems and solutions), and (d) enlightenment (People are not held responsible for solutions but responsible for problem). Their comparison of helping methodologies falling into the four categories led them to the conclusion that die compensatory model, the one which advocates empowerment, is generally the preferred one, particularly with disadvantaged populations. In this approach people are not held responsible for their problems but are expected to be active in the solutions, a philosophy which is congruent with the tenets of empowerment. Brickman et al. (1982) prefer die compensatory model because it avoids blaming-the-victim at the same time diat it benefits from the advantages associated with holding individuals responsible for improving dicir lives. Knowing that change is within their ability and control provides suffering people with an empowering feeling. Lord and Farlow (1990) discuss the implications of die compensatory paradigm for health promotion. According to diem die "individuals who achieved die greatest degree of control in their lives" (p. 3) were those who resisted blaming themselves and adopted an active stance with respect to dieir future aspirations. An application of the compensatory model by Rose and Black (1985) helped discharged psychiatric patients adjust to the community. They found diat dirough the externalization of blame, and dirough "seizing command of some aspect (however minute) of their lives" (p. 90), individuals attained a degree of dignity and self-respect that could not have been obtained otherwise.
Finally, empirical evidence for die positive results associated widi the compensatory mode of helping comes from the work of Lerner (1991) . Based on die assumption that occupational stress derives primarily from self-blaming, Lerner launched interventions designed to (a) reduce personal blame, and (b) modify oppressive working conditions, lie found that with a decrease in self-blaming comes an increase in ability to cope with stress at home and at work. This is partly explained by the increased sense of personal power that comes from being able to focus anger at oppressive work conditions. But it is also explained by the fact that once people are no longer totally disempowcred by self-blaming, they arc in a better position to formulate plans for how to engage in concrete struggles to change their environments. (Lerner, 1991, p. 44) The therapeutic aspects of the compensatory model can also be seen at the community level. A prime example of its powerful impact is furnished by die women's movement. In elucidating systemic (as opposed to personal) conditions of oppression and facilitating con-trol over their own affairs, Kravetz noted thai "consciousness-raising groups have served as an important mental health resource for women" (1987, p. 55) . Grass-roots associations (Boyle, 1990; Burgess, 1990) , students' and seniors' groups (Wolff, 1987) , native (O'Sullivan, Waugh, & Espeland, 1984) and poor rural communities (Serrano-Garcia, 1984) , among others, have been helped by the tools of social action advocated by empowerment theory.
To summarize, this section dealt with the moral and psychological foundations of empowerment in mainstream psychology. Next, I will examine some of the barriers to be encountered in promoting a wider acceptance for the concept of empowerment.
Obstacles
In spite of the fact that professional ethics call for the enablement and empowerment of vulnerable populations (Kultgcn, 1988; Lebacqz, 1985; Reeck, 1982) , most professions, in actuality, have eidier rejected these endeavours as illegitimate or paid little attention to them. What follows is an analysis of the main obstacles and arguments obstructing the introduction of empowering practices in psychology.
PROFESSIONAL CREDIBILITY Social action, a key empowerment strategy, has been historically perceived as undermining the credibility of the social sciences. In the social sciences, the conflict between so-called "academics" and "reformers" dates back to 1865, when the American Social Science Association was formed. This conflict is very well documented in Furncr's (1975) book Advocacy and objectivity. According to her, the "academics" had no trouble winning the struggle for recognition as "professionals." Unfortunately, the monopoly over professionalism exerted by die academics had rather adverse consequences. As Furner (1975) noted: "as professionalization proceeded, most social scientists stopped asking ethical questions" (p. 8).
The fear of reformers is associated with the intrusion of values in what is supposed to be a value-free enterprise (Wilding, 1982) . The claim is made that social action, and its concomitant values, derogate the scientific status of psychology (Robinson, 1984) . This argument neglects to consider two points. First, nonepistemic values, that is, social and political values, are an inherent part of psychology, whether we like it or not (Howard, 1985) . And second, claiming to be value-neutral is in itself a value-laden position, one that upholds die societal status quo. Failure or neglect to challenge predominant values translates into indirect support for them (Prilleltensky, 1989) . Empowerment, advocacy, and social action are not presented here for die pursuit of the narrow private interests of professionals, in which case the credibility of the profession may be jeopardized. On die contrary, empowerment is advanced as a means to fulfill our ethical commitment to the vulnerable (Hillerbrand, 1987) .
SOCIAL ETHICS
The study of social ediics in the social sciences in general and in psychology in particular has not received as much attention as it probably should (O'Neill, 1989; Tymchuk, 1989; Warwick, 1980) . This error of omission led to a narrow preoccupation with individual, as opposed to social ethics (For examples of this proclivity see APA, 1987; Cabot, 1926; Carroll, Schneider & Wesley, 1985; Clarke & Lawry, 1988) . As a result, die ethical dimensions of social action, power structures, domination and oppression do not receive the attention they merit.
A commitment toward the individual client, or what may be termed individual ethics (Prilleltensky, 1990a (Prilleltensky, , 1991 dominates the professional and psychological ediics literature. Few references are made in diat literature to the need to promote a social ethics mentality -an ediics that is directed toward enhancing die quality of life for large and vulnerable segments of society.
The negative effects of diis neglect are strongly felt in the helping professions.
Human services in general (McKnight, 1989) , and medicine (Wailzkin, 1989) , social work (Carniol, 1990; Gil, 1990) , and psychology in particular (PrilleUensky, 1989; 1990b; Walsh, 1988) provide examples of professional practices where, paradoxically, preoccupation with the single "case" may ultimately hurt the "case." This is simply because in searching for solutions to a client, attention is diverted from pervasive social forces that may have caused, contributed to, or perpetuated the nature of the problem. This is well illustrated in a program reported by Halpern in 1988. Attempts to minimize infants' diarrhea by psychoeducational measures were severely hindered by an overbearing environmental condition: lack of access to uncontaminated water. This is an incident where medical or psychological interventions should be accompanied by social and ecological change. In the context of psychotherapy, Lcmer (1991) also shows the debilitating effects of focussing exclusively on the individual. "Lacking a sense of social causality, most therapists interpret the frustrations of family and personal life as individual failings ... therapists implicitly suggest that the problems arc individual in scope" (p. 323). In spite of the ill-effects of this implicit message, therapies and therapists continue to reinforce die notion that it is only the client who needs to be changed, not the social conditions (Halleck, 1971 , Jacoby, 1976 Lerner, 1991; Nahem, 1981; Prilleltensky, 1989 Prilleltensky, , 1990b Prilleltensky, , 1990c . Such bias is prevalent in most social and medical services (McKnight, 1989; Waitzkin, 1989) .
If professionals are entrusted by society to enhance the quality of life for the population at large, then social ethics is as important as individual ethics. Yet, the former continue to be overshadowed by die latter. This bias is reflected in die Canadian code of ediics (CPA, 1991) , whereby responsibilities toward the individual client come before responsibilities toward society at large.
MERITOCRACY
Another reason why professionals have not regarded collective empowerment as vital is because of their fundamental belief diat die answer to social problems lies in individual merit (Bledstein, 1976; Hall, 1983; Kultgen, 1988; Pcrkin, 1990; Reiff, 1974; Wilding, 1982) . By embracing die ideology of meritocracy, whereby success and failure are explained in person-centered terms, professionals proceed to change individuals and not social structures. Professionals project onto society their own experience of success due to so-called talent and merit, thereby expecting their clients to improve dieir fortune not by social action but by personal effort.
DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
Empowerment calls for equitable distribution of power between professionals and citizens (I^ebacqz, 1985; Rappaport, 1981 Rappaport, , 1987 Riessman, 1986) , a departure from the customary practice of treating professionals widi deference and ascribing them moral and intellectual superiority. Empowerment will not occur unless professionals concede to share power widi the recipients of dieir services (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990 ), a development which many observers consider unlikely under die dominant hierarchical professional edios (Illich, 1977; Kultgen, 1988; Liebcrman, 1970; Perkin, 1990; Reiff, 1974; Wilding, 1982) . SCIENTIFIC TRAINING Psychologists are mosdy trained and socialized into a professional problem-solving mentality diat glorifies neat, sterile, lab-type methods and procedures, die kind that is not readily -if at all -applicable to social complexities (Sarason, 1978) . Psychology's adoption of die natural science's experimental approach as its preeminent paradigm had unpropitious repercussions for the usefulness and applicability of psychological knowledge to human and social problems (cf. Kline, 1988) . As Sarason (1981) put it, since its early days psychology committed itself to the cull of standardization, i.e., to contrive situations that would be standard for all people. This seemed to meet the scientific requirements of objectivity, reliability, and validity but at the expense of recognizing or pursuing the following question: how docs behavior in standardized situations relate to and illuminate behavior in naturally occurring situations, (p. 183).
Similarly, DeBocr (1983) wrote that "in nomothctic psychology ... the human being is methodically stripped of his(/her) historicity. The test-person is ahistorical" (p. 6). This ahistorical stance has largely prevented a full and rich understanding of the dynamics involved in life in the community.
The empowerment of individuals and communities requires the management of unpredictable variables, political complications, and uncontrollable social events. Traditional training does not prepare applied psychologists for this kind of work. The few attempts by mental health specialists to launch community-wide interventions that we have seen in the last decade or so have been conducted almost exclusively by community psychologists (Albee, Joffe, & Dusenbury, 1988; Rappaport, Swift, & Hess, 1984) , a professional group trained in a scientific approach that seeks to merge methodological rigour with real-life vicissitudes. Possibilities I have argued for the legitimacy of the concept of empowerment in mainstream psychology and outlined some of the obstacles for its inclusion in our profession. In this section I wish to discuss two areas of psychology dial might particularly benefit from the values and theory of empowerment. The first has to do with ethics. The second, with issues of control, power, and well-being.
QUOTIDIAN ETHICS
Empowerment brings to the forefront of scientific and professional endeavours three values: self-determination, distributive justice, and collaborative and democratic participation. In fact, it may be argued that the main dirust of empowerment theory is the dissemination and permeation of ethical values into everyday activities. The term quotidian ethics refers to the recurrent application and promotion of moral values in the various services professionals provide. I offer this term to suggest that ethics arc to be of prime concern in performing daily routines. Ethics become a matter of constant observance, and to a large degree determine the contents and procedures of the occupational realm. This is to be contrasted widi the current attitude toward ethics. In the present atmosphere, professional ethics are essentially equated with rules and regulations to be upheld and called upon to discipline misconduct. Quotidian ethics proactively procure the enhancement of certain moral values in every aspect of the professional's life.
Moral philosophy should be easily accessed and debated by professionals and consumers alike. Ethics should not remain exclusively in the hands of ethical boards or applied moral philosophers. For as long as die public feels excluded from the ethical decision-making process affecting professions, professionals and citizens, die risk of nurturing an elitist kind of ethics is perpetuated.
The concept quotidian ethics is evocative of Cohen's (1988) discourse ethics, "with its emphasis on die equal participation of all concerned in public discussions on contested norms" (p. 315). According to Cohen (1988) , social policies and professional activities are to be regarded as legitimate only if all those possibly affected by diem would have an equal opportunity to voice dieir concerns, and a vote on the final decision. The term discourse ethics, like quotidian ethics, is drawn from "die principles of democracy" (Cohen, 1988, p. 315) :
Quotidian ethics attempt to incorporate moral values into the occupational realm and disseminate them among all individuals concerned, service providers as well as citizens/consumers. Proponents of empowerment have made a great deal of progress in translating these principles into action. As it was pointed out in this paper, the values of empowerment are congruent widi the values of professional ethics in general. The empowerment paradigm affords professionals an opportunity to actively pursue the fulfillment of their moral duties; primarily those concerned with the social welfare of the population at large, an area largely neglected in professional circles.
Quotidian ethics may be practiced at the university as well as at the community. Courses dealing with the social ethics and the values of psychology may be introduced at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. The degree of congruity between empowerment values and the contents and processes of psychology curricula could be the subject of discussions among students, staff, and faculty. In the community, psychologists can engage the public in debating service priorities. With limited resources, service providers struggle between giving immediate help to individuals in need and planning long-term interventions and prevention programmes to enhance the welfare of the community at large. The ethical and social repercussions of each course of action need to be carefully examined, and input from consumers is vital in this process. An excellent illustration of how the ethical values of empowerment can be incorporated into counseling with individuals and families is provided by Dunst, Trivette, and Deal (1988) . Their clinical work reaches a rarely attained integration of client participation, self-determination, and sensitivity to restrictive social circumstances and life events. These values are similarly reflected in the therapeutic work of Lerner (1991) with individuals and occupational stress groups. These authors attempt to operate from a clinical framework that would seem to be congruent with the philosophy of quotidian ethics.
In summary, the language of empowerment fosters public debate on moral issues. It vitalizes individual and social ethics. In applying the values of empowerment to their teaching, research, and interventions, psychologists would be advancing die practice of quotidian ethics.
CONTROL, POWER, AND WELL-BEING
It has been argued that psychological wellbeing is generally enhanced by control over one's life events and circumstances (Langer & Rodin, 1976; Lerner, 1991; Thompson & Spacapan, 1991) . However, an important distinction is to be made between the perception of control and real experiences of control and power. Research and interventions dealing exclusively with the perceptions of control have serious limitations. Attempts to increase perceptions of control will have different effects depending on whether the individuals live under relatively empowering or disempowering conditions. Whereas in the former situation people may benefit from these efforts, in the latter people still have to contend with depriving living circumstances. At this point more than purely psychological help is needed. Individuals and groups facing disempowering life events and circumstances require assistance in changing not only their perceptions of power, but also, and more importantly, the real constellations of social power that deprive them of rights, goods and services (e.g., Kallcn, 1989) . The latter is the realm of empowerment.
Since certain injurious systemic conditions remain present even after we adjust our cognitions, an optimistic explanatory style (Seligman, 1990) may be considered only the first step in propelling people into changing demeaning and oppressive societal structures. Following a process of cognitive liberation equivalent to saying: "It is not my fault," oppressed individuals need to be empowered to oppose structural configurations of power that precluded them from experiencing control in the past and perpetuate their misfortune in the present.
Furthermore, interventions designed to enhance the level of control people exercise over their affairs provide an insight into the real-life dynamics of power that can be rarely attained by the somewhat removed, laboratory-type of research on perceptions of control and attributional style. Hence, we might conclude that when dealing with depriving psychosocial environments, empow-crment research and action arc needed to complement psychological interventions dealing primarily widi perceptions and cognitions. This is solid ground for the construction of bridges between the fields of empowerment and control theory in particular, and between community psychology and mainstream psychology in general.
Conclusion
The concept of empowerment brings to die forefront of research and action the unequal distribution of power among citizens and its concomitant personal and societal repercussions. Problems deriving from excessive and unjustified use of power are endemic in families, classrooms, industry, business, religious settings, and governments. Practically in almost every sphere of our lives there is the potential for psychological damage caused by some people oppressively controlling odiers. Le terme appropriation du pouvoir («em-powerment» en anglais) est generalement utilise pour designer toute intervention ou politique dont lc but est de rehausser le degre de controle que les individus vulnerables excrccnt sur leur propre vie. Jusqu'a present, les psychologues des milieux universitaires ct de la psychologic appliquce se rcfuscnt a accorder a ce concept une importance predominante. On y soulicnt que si l'on veul elargir la theoric dc I'appropriation du pouvoir au-dela du domaine de la psychologie communautairc vers des domaines plus traditionncls de la psychologie, comine la psychologic sociale, la psychologie de la personnalitc, la psychologie clinique et scolairc, on devra tnieux expliqucr ses assiscs morales et psychologiques. Afin d'illustrcr cette affirmation, l'autcur nous prcsente un modele conccptuel integre de I'appropriation du pouvoir. Lc modele possede un objectif double: (a) comprendre le concept dc l'appropriation du pouvoir en specifiant scs multiples facettes, et (b) offrir un cadre d'analyse pour 1'avanccmcrii de la recherche dans le domaine. IJZ modele met 1'accent sur les trois principaux elements de l'appropriaiion du pouvoir donl on a deja traite dans de nombrcuscs etudes sur le sujct. Ce sont les valeurs, les proccssus et les agents/depositaires d'enjeux. I^es valeurs de l'appropriation du pouvoir, a savoir la determination de soi, la justice distributive, ainsi que la participation collaborative et democratique deierminent et guident les mecanismes et les agents/depositaires d'enjeux de l'appropriation du pouvoir. Ces valeurs sont integrees par les cherchcurs aussi bien que par les agents dc services sociaux. 1-cs agents sont des personnes qui posent des actions qui leur donnent un plus grand controle de leur propre vie et/ou aident les autres a prendre controle de leur vie. Les depositaires d'enjeux sont des personnes ou des groupes qu'on invite a participer au processus. L'ideal est que les depositaires d'enjeux deviennent aussi vite que possible les agents de l'appropriation du pouvoir eux-memes. Dans la troisiemc section, l'autcur s'attardc a la variete d'aciions et de mecanismes qui sc produisent lorsqu'on ctudic ct fait la promotion de l'appropriation du pouvoir. Les questions suivantes aident a mieux comprendre les actions et les mecanismes qui menent a l'appropriaiion du pouvoir: ou, comment et pourquoi l'appropriation du pouvoir se produit-cllc, et quelles sont les conditions neccssaircs et suirisantes pour qu'cllc sc dcveloppe? I*e processus de ('appropriation du pouvoir peut se presenter comine le resultat des actions naturcllcs des personnes qui cherchent a obtcnir plus de conirole sur les choscs qui les concernent, ou comme la consequence des interventions sociales venant de 1'exterieur. Pour ce qui est des actions, elles ont plusicurs formes. Ellcs peuvent etrc lc rcsullat d'aciions sociales initiccs par des individus impuissants, ou encore etre posccs par des organisaieurs communautaircs et des iherapeutes qui encourageraicnt, par exemple, des femmes a quitter unc situation de couple ou elles sont victime d'abus. Ce qui definit une intervention comme de l'appropriation du pouvoir n'est done pas son contcnu specifique mais plutot son adhesion aux valeurs de l'appropriation du pouvoir.
Afin de justifier la pertinence du modele qu'il propose, l'auteur en cxplique les bases Resume 375 philosophiqucs ct psychologiques. II soutient que les deux aspects sonl necessaires si on veut arriver a une comprehension intcgree et holistique de l'appropriation du pouvoir. La base philosophique morale juslifie la poursuitc dc l'appropriation du pouvoir, tandis quc la base psychologiquc en facilite la promotion. La psychologic a beaucoup a ofTrir et a gagner dans ce domaine. I-a psychologie du controle de soi pent enrichir la recherche sur l'appropriation du pouvoir; ceux qui font des recherches sur le controle peuvent beaucoup apprendre a observer l'experience de l'appropriation du pouvoir vecue dans des milieux reels.
Malgre le fait que la dcontologic professionnelle clame l'importancc de l'habilitation et de l'appropriation du pouvoir des populations vulnerablcs, la plupart des professions, en fait, ont, ou bien rejete de tcllcs tentatives comme illegilimes, ou bien ne leur oni reserve que tres peu d'attcntion. En definissant leurs devoirs moraux, les professions n'ont traditionncllcmcnt chcrchc qu'a assurer le bien-etre de leurs clients immediats et ont neglige de prendre en consideration (a) le bien-etre de la communautc en general, et (b) la necessite de changer les structures sociales nuisibles. La psychologie n'a pas echappc a ccttc tendance. L'auteur dc cct article offre une analyse des principaux obstacles et arguments empechant l'introduction en psychologie des pratiques de l'appropriation du pouvoir.
Dans la dernicrc section de cet article, l'auteur traite des deux domaincs dc la psychologie qui peuvent bencficicr des valcurs et de la theorie de l'appropriation du pouvoir. Le premier touchc la dcontologie et Ic second, les questions dc controle, de pouvoir ct dc bicn-ctre. Quant au premier, on pcut maintcnir que la poussee principale de la theorie de l'appropriation du pouvoir cst la dissemination et l'infiltration des valcurs deontologiques dans des activites quotidiennes. L'auteur introduit le tcrmc deontologie quotidienne afin de mcttrc l'accent sur la necessite d'appliquer ct dc promouvoir de facon continue les valcurs morales dans les divers services fournis par les profcssionncls. II utilise cc terme afin de suggerer que la deonlologic doit ctrc d'une importance primordiale dans I'accomplissement des taches routinieres. Dans ce coiilcxtc, les principes deontologiques ineritent d'etre rigourcusement observes, et, en grande parlie, dctcrmincnt le contenu et les procedes du domainc occupationnel. Ceci vient en contradiction avee 1'attitude actuelle face a la dcontologie. Dc nos jours, la dcontologie professionnelle est generalemcnt misc sur lc meme pied que les regies et reglcments a respecter et auxquels on fait appel dans des cas d'inconduite. La deontologie quotidienne aide a rehausser de facon proactive certaines valeurs morales dans tous les aspects de la vie d'un professionnel.
En ce qui concerne le deuxieme doinainc d'intcret, on soutient quc Ic bienetre psychologique est generalement rehausse en prenant controle des evenements ct des circonstances de sa vie. Toutefois, on ctablit une distinction importantc cntrc la perception de controle et I'experience reelle de controle et de pouvoir. Les recherches et les interventions qui s'interessent exclusivement aux perceptions de controle sont severement li mi tees. Des tentatives d'amcliorcr les perceptions dc controle auront des effets differents si les individus vivent dans des conditions relativement favorables ou defavorables a l'appropriation du pouvoir. Tandis que dans la premiere situation, les gens peuvent beaucoup retirer de ces tcnlativcs, dans la deuxieme, les gens auront toujours a fairc face a des circonstances de vie de privation. En lcqucl cas, nous avons besoin dc plus que d'une aide pureinent psychologique. Les individus et les groupes qui doivent faire face a des evenements et a des circonstances de vie defavorables a l'appropriation du pouvoir ont besoin d'aidc pour changer, non seulement lcur perception du pouvoir, mais egalement, ct plus encore, cette veritable constellation du pouvoir social qui les privent de droits, de biens et de services.
